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NOTES AND COMMENTS
LOUISIANA'S "BALANCED-TREATMENT" ACT
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD
I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson wrote, "I contemplate with sovereign reverence
that act of the whole American people which declared that their legisla-
ture should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation
between church and State."' The Supreme Court later adopted Jeffer-
son's interpretation2 of the religion clauses of the first amendment; 3 how-
ever, attempts to erect Jefferson's "wall of separation" have resulted in
decisions which imprecisely define what constitutes "establishment" of
religion. Thus, Chief Justice Burger conceded in Lemon v. Kurtzman4
1. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting 8 JEFF. WORKS 113).
2. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
16 (1947); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... The religion clauses of the first amendment
are applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940). "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Everson, 330
U.S. at 15. Contra, Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala.), stay
granted, 459 U.S. 1314, modified sub nom. Wallace v. Jaffree, 705 F.2d 1526 (1 1th Cir. 1983), prob.
juris noted, 466 U.S. 924 (1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), where Chief Judge W. Brevard Hand
held that the first amendment did not apply to the states, and that Alabama therefore had the power
to establish a state religion if it so chose. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens
responded:
Before analyzing the precise issue that is presented to us, it is nevertheless appropriate to
recall how firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence is the proposition that the
several States have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the
First Amendment than does the Congress of the United States.
... [W]hen the Constitution was amended to prohibit any State from depriving any
person of liberty without due process of law, that Amendment imposed the same substan-
tive limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First Amendment had always
imposed on the Congress' power. This Court has confirmed and endorsed this elementary
proposition of law time and time again.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48-49 (1985) (footnote omitted).
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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that the line between Church and State was a blurry one at best.' In
Lemon, the Supreme Court announced a test for use in Establishment
Clause cases, now known as the Lemon test.6 Nevertheless, the Justices
disagree on how the test should be applied7 and the goal the test is meant
to achieve.'
The Lemon test is a three-pronged examination used by the Supreme
Court to determine whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause
of the first amendment. A constitutional statute (1) must have a secular
legislative purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an exces-
sive governmental entanglement with religion.9 If the Supreme Court
finds that a statute violates any of the three prongs, the Court will invali-
date the statute.10
Edwards v. Aguillard " focused on the first prong of the Lemon test.
In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held that the Louisiana
"Balanced Treatment for Creation Science and Evolution Science Act"' 2
(the Balanced Treatment Act) lacked a secular purpose and was there-
fore unconstitutional. The Balanced Treatment Act mandated teaching
5. Id. at 612.
6. The Lemon test requires that "[flirst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13
(footnote omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
7. "The secular purpose prong has proven mercurial in application because it has never been
fully defined, and we have never fully stated how the test is to operate." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. Supreme Court Justices have traditionally believed that government neutrality is the ulti-
mate goal. "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both
of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend
to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). See also Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (government required to take a neutral position between religion
and nonreligion); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (reaf-
firming the State's neutral position). But see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Establishment Clause does not require government neutrality, and that there is no
historical basis for such interpretation).
9. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam), where the Court stated
that "[i]fa statute violates any of these three principles, it must be struck down under the Establish-
ment Clause." See also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (second and third prongs of the Lemon test are
inapplicable if the statute does not have a clearly secular purpose).
11. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
12. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-286.7 (West 1982). The entire text of the statute reads
as follows:
Section 286.1. Short Title
This Subpart shall be known as the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science Act."
Section 286.2. Purpose
This Subpart is enacted for the purposes of protecting academic freedom.
2
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"creation-science" whenever theories of evolution were taught in public
Section 286.3. Definitions
As used in this Subpart, unless otherwise clearly indicated, these terms have the fol-
lowing meanings:
(1) "Balanced treatment" means providing whatever information and instruction in
both creation and evolution models the classroom teacher determines is necessary and ap-
propriate to provide insight into both theories in view of the textbooks and other instruc-
tional materials available for use in his classroom.
(2) "Creation-science" means the scientific evidences for creation and inferences from
those scientific evidences.
(3) "Evolution-science" means the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences
from those scientific evidences.
(4) "Public schools" mean public secondary and elementary schools.
Section 286.4. Authorization for balanced treatment; requirement for nondiscrimation.
A. Commencing with the 1982-1983 school year, public schools within this state
shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. Balanced treat-
ment of these two models shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a whole for each
course, in textbook materials taken as a whole for each course, in library materials taken as
a whole for the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational
programs in public schools, to the extent that such lectures, textbooks, library materials,
or educational programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin of man, life, the
earth, or the universe. When creation or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a
theory, rather than as proven scientific fact.
B. Public schools within this state and their personnel shall not discriminate by re-
ducing a grade of a student or by singling out and publicly criticizing any student who
demonstrates a satisfactory understanding of both evolution-science or creation-science
and who accepts or rejects either model in whole or part.
C. No teacher in public elementary or secondary school or instructor in any state-
supported university in Louisiana, who chooses to be a creation-scientist or to teach scien-
tific data which points to creationism shall, for that reason, be discriminated against in any
way by any school board, college board, or administrator.
Section 286.5. Clarifications
This Subpart does not require any instruction in the subject of origins but simply
permits instruction in both scientific models (of evolution-science and creation-science) if
public schools choose to teach either. This Subpart does not require each individual text-
book or library book to give balanced treatment to the models of evolution-science and
creation-science; it does not require any school books to be discarded. This Subpart does
not require each individual classroom lectures in a course to give such balanced treatment
but simply permits the lectures as a whole to give balanced treatment; it permits some
lectures to present evolution-science and other lectures to present creation-science.
Section 286.6. Funding of inservice training and materials acquisition
Any public school that elects to present any model of origins shall use existing teacher
inservice training funds to prepare teachers of public school courses presenting any model
of origins to give balanced treatment to the creation-science and the evolution-science
model. Existing library acquisition funds shall be used to purchase nonreligious library
books as are necessary to give balanced treatment to the creation-science model and the
evolution-science model.
Section 286.7. Curriculum development
A. Each city and parish school board shall develop and provide to each public
school classroom teacher in the system a curriculum guide on presentation of creation-
science.
B. The governor shall designate seven creation-scientists who shall provide resource
services in the development of curriculum guides to any city or parish school board upon
request. Each such creation-scientist shall be designated from among the full-time faculty
members teaching in any college and university in Louisiana. These creation-scientists
shall serve at the pleasure of the governor and without compensation.
3
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schools. 3 The problem, however, was that the Louisiana legislature in-
cluded in the Balanced Treatment Act a specific statement that the Act's
passage was for a secular purpose. 14 Nevertheless, the Court disregarded
this stated purpose and inferred a preeminent religious purpose to strike
down the Act.15
In Edwards, the Court clarified the degree of religious purpose that
a statute, arguably violative of the Establishment Clause, is allowed to
have and still pass the purpose prong of the Lemon test. The decision
marked only the third time that the Court has struck down a statute
under the Lemon test's purpose prong. 16 The two previous statutes failed
the purpose prong for having completely religious purposes.' 7 The Ed-
wards Court, however, struck down the Balanced Treatment Act merely
for having a "primary purpose" of advancing religion.' 8 Thus, in Ed-
wards the Supreme Court clarified its standard for determining a viola-
tion of Lemon's purpose prong, thereby defeating the Louisiana
legislature's attempt to classify creationism as a science.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
In June, 1980, Louisiana State Senator Bill Keith 19 introduced legis-
lation entitled "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science in Public School Instruction."20 The Louisiana State Legislature
passed the bill, and Governor David Treen signed the statute into law
13. Id. at § 17:286.4A.
14. Id. at § 17:286.2 (section 286.2 provides that "[t]his Subpart is enacted for the purposes of
protecting academic freedom").
15. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2584 (1987).
16. Id. at 2593 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The other two statutes were struck down in Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (statute allowing for a daily moment of silent prayer in public schools),
and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (statute ordering the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public classrooms). One statute was also struck down due to lack of secular
purpose prior to the Lemon decision. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) ("anti-evolu-
tion" statute which forbade any teaching of the theory of evolution).
17. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (statute is unconstitutional if it is entirely motivated by
a nonsecular purpose); Stone, 449 U.S. 41 (statute with no secular legislative purpose held
unconstitutional).
18. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court held that "[b]ecause the primary purpose of the
Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of
the First Amendment." Id.
19. Senator Keith reportedly began working on the Balanced Treatment Act after learning that
his son's science teacher had refused to accept as satisfactory the boy's explanation of the origin of
man. The younger Keith's response had been, "God created the world, and God created Man."
Reidinger, Creationism in the Classroom, 72 A.B.A. J. 66, 67 (1986).
20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.286.1-286.7 (Vest 1982).
[Vol. 23:235
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on July 20, 1981.2' The Balanced Treatment Act did not require that
any instruction be given as to the origin of man,az but it did mandate that
"creation-science" must be taught whenever "evolution-science" is
taught.23
Uncertainty over the Act's constitutionality eventually led to litiga-
tion. When the Louisiana Department of Education failed to implement
the Balanced Treatment Act,2 4 Senator Keith filed suit seeking to have
the Act declared constitutional and to force its implementation.2 5 Par-
ents challenging the Balanced Treatment Act in a separate suit sought
declaratory relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana 6 to have the Balanced Treatment Act declared uncon-
stitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution, and to enjoin the Act's implementation.2 7 That suit
was stayed pending the outcome of Senator Keith's suit.
28
The parents' suit focused on the intent of the legislature in passing
the Balanced Treatment Act.29 The plaintiffs, who included Louisiana
teachers and religious leaders,3° claimed that the Act's purpose was to
attack the theory of evolution, and to incorporate the Biblical theory of
creationism into public education.3" The defendants, Louisiana state offi-
cials who were charged with implementing the Balanced Treatment
Act,32 argued that the statute was passed with the intent of promoting
21. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2597 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. "This Subpart does not require any instruction in the subject of origins but simply permits
instruction in both scientific models (of evolution-science and creation-science) if public schools
choose to teach either." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.5 (West 1982).
23. Id. at § 17:286.4A.
24. J. Kelly Nix, Superintendent of the Louisiana Department of Education, believed the Bal-
anced Treatment Act to be unconstitutional, and decided to forego implementing it until its constitu-
tionality was judicially decided. Comment, The Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act: A
Fundamentalist Facade?, 9 S.U.L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1982).
25. That suit was eventually dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Keith v. Louisiana Dep't of
Educ., 553 F. Supp. 295 (M.D. La. 1982).
26. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2576 & nn.1-2 (1987).
27. Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704, 706 (La. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Aguillard v. Edwards,
765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), prob. juris, noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573
(1987).
28. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2576 n.2.
29. Id. at 2576.
30. Id.
31. Edwards, 765 F.2d at 1254.
32. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2576 n.l. The defendants included the Governor, Attorney General,
and State Superintendent of Education of Louisiana, the State Department of Education, and the St.
Tammany Parish School Board. The Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education and
the Orleans Parish School Board were originally named as defendants in the suit, but both were later
realigned as plaintiffs. Id.
1987]
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academic freedom, and therefore was constitutional. 3
The United States district court invalidated the Balanced Treatment
Act as violative of the United States Constitution. 34 The court granted
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment35 and enjoined the imple-
mentation of the Balanced Treatment Act,36 stating that teaching the
doctrine of creation-science necessarily entails the teaching of a religious
tenet, the existence of a Divine Creator.37
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court deci-
sion,3' agreeing that the statute was intended to promote a religious be-
lief.39 The defendant petitioned the United States Supreme Court, which
noted probable jurisdiction over the case on May 5, 1986.40
B. Issue
Edwards addressed the issue of whether the Balanced Treatment
Act violated the Establishment Clause, and more specifically whether a
secular legislative purpose prompted passage of the Act.4 The Supreme
Court found no valid secular purpose and struck down the Balanced
Treatment Act on June 19, 1987.42
33. Id. at 2576.
34. Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 429 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. Aguillard v. Edwards,
765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), prob. juris noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573
(1987). After dismissing Senator Keith's suit on jurisdictional grounds, Keith v. Louisiana Dep't of
Educ., 553 F. Supp. 295 (M.D. La. 1982), the district court lifted its stay on Aguillard v. Treen, and
(in an unpublished opinion) United States District Judge Adrian Duplantier held the Balanced
Treatment Act to be in violation of the Louisiana Constitution. The defendants appealed that deci-
sion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which certified the state constitu-
tional question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the
question of whether the Louisiana legislature had the authority under the state constitution to pre-
scribe courses of public school study-a duty assigned by the state constitution to the Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE). The State Supreme Court held that BESE's power
was not exclusive, and that the ability to pass laws setting public school curriculums remained in the
state legislature's plenary powers. Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704, 710 (La. 1983). When the
high court of Louisiana found no violation of the state constitution, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to address the federal constitutional
questions. Aguillard v. Treen, 720 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1983).
35. Treen, 634 F. Supp. at 427.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 428.
38. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), prob.juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946
(1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). In May of 1984, Edwin W. Edwards replaced David Treen as
Governor of Louisiana, and thus, as a defendant in this case.
39. Id. at 1253.
40. Edwards v. Aguillard, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (1986).
41. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577-78 (1987).
42. Id.
6
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III. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. The Development of a Test
In the 1920's, John Thomas Scopes attempted to teach the theory of
evolution to his Tennessee biology class in spite of the state's "monkey
law," which prohibited the teaching of theories which were contrary
to the Biblicial story of Creation.43 Scopes was convicted of violating the
statute and fined one hundred dollars." The Supreme Court of
Tennessee refused to sustain Scope's Establishment Clause challenge to
the statute,45 but the court did reverse Scope's conviction on technical
grounds.46
To decide the statute's constitutionality, the Tennessee court fo-
cused on the effect of the statute, rather than on its purpose. Scopes
challenged the validity of the statute on the grounds that the motive of
the Tennessee legislature in passing the anti-evolution statute was im-
proper.' 7 The court responded that "the validity of a statute must be
determined by its natural and legal effect, rather than proclaimed mo-
tives."4" The Tennessee court's holding that the purpose of the statute
was not relevant to its validity was eventually superceded by the United
States Supreme Court's formal Establishment Clause test.
49
The Supreme Court announced its first Establishment Clause test in
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.5 ° Two previous deci-
sions"' served as the source of the test the Court used to strike down a
43. 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 50, known as the Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act provides in pertinent
part:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That it
shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the Universitis[sic], Normals and all other
public schools of the State which are supported in whole or in part by the public school
funds of the State, to teach any theory that denies the story of the Devine Creation of man
as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a lower order of
animals.
44. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
45. Id. at -, 289 S.W. at 366-67. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated:
We are not able to see how the prohibition of teaching the theory that man has descended
from a lower order of animals gives preference to any religious establishment or mode of
worship.... Belief or unbelief in the theory of evolution is no more a characteristic of any
religious establishment or mode of worship than is belief or unbelief in the wisdom of the
prohibition laws.
Id. at -, 289 S.W. at 367.
46. Id. Tennessee law required any fine over fifty dollars to be imposed by a jury. Scope's fine
was imposed by the trial judge. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citations omitted).
49. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
50. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
51. Id. at 222. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (focusing on the requirement
7
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statute that required Bible reading in public schools.5" According to the
Court, the test for violation of the Establishment Clause considered both
the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment.5 3 Justice Clark ex-
plained the application of the rule, stating that "to withstand the stric-
tures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion." 4 Thus, the Court derived a two-part test.
The Court rejected the school board's contention that the decision
established a "religion of secularism."55 Justice Clark pointed out the
value of studying religious materials for their literary and historic value,
and noted that the first amendment does not prohibit any teaching of the
Bible or religion when it is presented objectively. 6 Justice Clark stated
that the teaching of Biblical theory in public schools is not unconstitu-
tional;57 however, the study of the Bible is limited to its "literary and
historic qualities."58
While Abington addressed a state's attempt to promote religion by
requiring the use of religious materials in the schools, Epperson v. Arkan-
sas59 represented a state's attempt to promote religion by keeping theo-
ries contrary to religion out of the schools. Epperson involved a 1928
"anti-evolution" statute, which prohibited teaching the theory of evolu-
tion60 in any state supported school. A unanimous Supreme Court re-
versed the Arkansas Supreme Court and struck down the statute.6'
Justice Fortas equated the Arkansas statute with Tennessee's "monkey
of government neutrality to uphold a program that reimbursed school children-including students
of parochial schools-for their public transportation bus fare when traveling to and from school);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961) (holding that the purpose and effect of a Sunday
Closing Law was "not to aid religion, but to set aside a day of rest and recreation").
52. "The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law ... requires that '[a]t least ten verses from
the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school
day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the
written request of his parent or guardian.'" Abington, 374 U.S. at 205 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
24 § 15-1516 (Purdon 1962)).
53. Id. at 222.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 225.
56. Id.
57. The Court stated that "[n]othing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or
of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected
consistently with the First Amendment." Id.
58. Id.
59. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
60. "[I]t shall be unlawful for any teacher or other instructor in any University, College, Nor-
mal, Public School, or other institution of the State ... to teach the theory or Doctrine that mankind
ascended or descended from a lower order of animals .... ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80.1627 (1947).
61. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109.
[Vol. 23:235
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law," writing that "there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was
the same: to suppress the teaching of a theory which, it was thought,
'denied' the divine creation of man."62 Justice Fortas cited Abington's
purpose and effect test as one of several precedents used to strike the
statute.63
The Court also noted in Epperson that the state had the right to
prescribe a curriculum for its public schools, 64 and that not all religious
study in public schools is unconstitutional.6 ' According to the Court,
the historic and literary study of religion and the Bible is allowed when it
is presented objectively as part of a secular program of education. 66 Jus-
tice Fortas warned, though, that the state cannot develop its curriculum
around religious principles.67 When combined, Abington and Epperson
prohibit anti-evolutionists from promoting their religious beliefs by forc-
ing the teaching of creationism or by excluding contrary theory.
In Walz v. Tax Commission,68 the Court introduced a third criterion
to determine a violation of the Establishment Clause: whether the chal-
lenged act caused an excessive entanglement between the government
and religion.69 In Walz, the Court upheld New York's property tax ex-
emption of any property held by religious organizations and used solely
for worship.7" After finding that the law's purpose was secular,7' Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, went on to say that "[w]e must
also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion."' 72 Although Chief Justice Burger ap-
peared to be applying the effect prong of the Court's previously
62. Id. See also id. at 108 n.16, which avers that "[t]he following advertisement is typical of the
public appeal which was used in the campaign to secure adoption of the statute:
THE BIBLE OR ATHEISM, WHICH?
All atheists favor evolution. If you agree with atheism vote against Act No. 1. If you
agree with the Bible vote for Act No. 1.... Shall conscientious church members be forced
to pay taxes to support teachers to teach evolution which will undermine the faith of their
children? The Gazette said Russian Bolshevists laughed at Tennessee. True, and that sort
will laugh at Arkansas. Who cares? Vote FOR ACT NO. 1."
Id. (quoting from the Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 4, 1928, at 12, cols. 4-5).
63. Id. at 107.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 106.
66. Id.
67. "There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit the State to
require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious
sect or dogma." Id.
68. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
69. Id. at 674.
70. Id. at 666.
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announced purpose and effect test, his discussion of "excessive entangle-
ment" was evidently so popular among the other Justices that it was later
incorporated as a third prong of Establishment Clause scrutiny.
The Court eventually arrived at the current Establishment Clause
test by combining the purpose and effect analysis it used in Abington and
Epperson with the entanglement factor from Walz. The modern test,
commonly known as the Lemon test, is a three-pronged examination
named for the case in which it was enunciated, Lemon v. Kurtzman.73
Chief Justice Burger stated: "First, the statute must have a secular legis-
lative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' ,7 The Supreme
Court has used the Lemon "purpose-effect-entanglement" examination in
nearly every Establishment Clause case it has decided since the test's
inception.75
B. Application of the Lemon Test
Kentucky legislators must have had the Lemon test in mind when
they passed the statute76 later challenged in Stone v. Graham,7 because
they took special steps to display a secular intent. The Kentucky law
required that the Ten Commandments be posted on the wall of each pub-
lic school classroom in the state and mandated that each display contain
a statement of the display's secular purposes. 78 The Supreme Court
73. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
74. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). The first two prongs of the Lemon test, although attrib-
uted by Chief Justice Burger to Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), restate the purpose
and effect concepts of School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). These
two prongs of the test were stated in Abington as "what are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment?" Id. at 222. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), served as the source of the third
prong.
75. The single exception to the Court's consistent use of the Lemon test in Establishment
Clause cases is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Nebraska legislature's practice of having a state-paid chaplain open each session with
a prayer, basing its decision on the historical acceptance of the practice, which dated back to colonial
times. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "ftio invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 'establishment' of religion or a step toward estab-
lishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country." Id. at 792.
76. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
77. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
78. "In small print below the last commandment shall appear a notation concerning the pur-
pose of the display, as follows: *The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in
its adoption as the fundamental legal Code of Western Civilization and The Common Law of the
United States.'" Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
[Vol. 23:235
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ignored the stated secular purpose, observing instead that the Command-
ments are undeniably religious.79
Stone was the first occasion in the history of the Lemon test that the
Court disregarded a stated a secular purpose and imputed a religious one.
Significantly, in the past the Court had commonly deferred to legislative
statements of purpose or to findings of secular purpose made by state
courts.80 Both were present here, and both were ignored.81
After the Court determined that legislative statements of purpose
would not always be decisive, it then determined which factors to use to
find the actual purpose for the passage of a statute. In Wallace v. Jaf-
free,82 the Court stated that one factor to consider was how an act
changed existing law. The Alabama statute challenged in Wallace al-
lowed public schools to observe a daily minute of silence "for meditation
or voluntary prayer."83 Because Alabama already had a similar law on
the books which allowed a minute of silence for meditation,84 and this
new statute only added the words "or voluntary prayer," the Supreme
Court concluded that the act must have been passed for the impermissi-
ble purpose of endorsing or promoting prayer in the public school sys-
tems of Alabama." Thus the law was struck down. The Wallace Court
also held that a statute may pass the Lemon test, and therefore be consti-
tutional, even if it is motivated in part by a religious purpose. However,
the Court warned that any statute motivated entirely by a religious pur-
pose must be invalidated.86 Until the Edwards decision, Wallace and
79. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. The Stone Court refused to defer to the Kentucky legislature's
avowed secular purpose in passing the law and, instead, found a purely religious intent. The Court's
per curiam opinion found a total lack of secular purpose and stated that "[t]he pre-eminent purpose
for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten
Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative
recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Id. (footnote omitted).
80. "The Court's summary rejection of a secular purpose articulated by the legislature and
confirmed by the state court is without precedent in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This Court
regularly looks to legislative articulations of a statute's purpose in Establishment Clause cases and
accords such pronouncements the deference they are due." Id. at 43-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
83. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1986).
84. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1986).
85. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court's understand-
ing of the Establishment Clause in general and its use of the Lemon test in particular. Justice Rehn-
quist asserted that the "wall of separation between church and state" metaphor-taken from a
"short note of courtesy" written by Thomas Jefferson while in France 14 years after the passage of
the Bill of Rights (see supra note I and accompanying text)-has misled the courts as to the actual
intent of the first amendment's drafters, and has caused the neither principled nor unified Establish-
ment Clause decisions made by the Court. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 56.
1987]
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Stone were the only examples of statutes failing the purpose prong of the
Lemon test.
87
IV. THE EDWARDS DECISION
In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's holding that the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act violated the
Establishment Clause.8" Justice Brennan, writing for the 7-2 majority, 89
again turned to the Lemon test for resolution of the case,9° but had only
to apply the purpose prong to find the statute unconstitutional. 9t
The Court used a two-step approach to hold that the Balanced
Treatment Act failed the purpose prong of the Lemon test. First, the
Court found the stated legislative purpose of "protecting academic free-
dom" 92 to be a fictive motive. Justice Brennan, using a term from a pre-
vious concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor, 93 wrote that "[w]hile the
87. The "anti-evolution" statute involved in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), was
also found to have no secular purpose, but that case was decided before the adoption of the Lemon
test.
88. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2584 (1987).
89. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens-and by
Justice O'Connor in all but Part II. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
O'Connor joined. Justice White wrote his own opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented.
Part II of the majority decision implied that the "special context of the public elementary and
secondary school system" warranted extraordinary consideration of the Balanced Treatment Act.
Justice Brennan wrote that "in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we must do so mindful of
the particular concerns that arise in the context of public elementary and secondary schools." Id. at
2577-78. Noting that school-age children are impressionable, their attendance in public schools is
not voluntary, and that the Court has frequently been called upon to decide Establishment Clause
cases in public school contexts, Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he Court has been particularly vigi-
lant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools."
Id. at 2577. The opinion never stated, though, what difference this "special context" made to the
holding of the case.
90. Id. Justice Brennan noted that the Lemon test had been used in every Establishment Clause
case since its inception in 1971, with the exception of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See
supra note 75. The Marsh form of analysis, looking to whether the practice was common and al-
lowed at the time of the writing of the first amendment, was inapplicable in Edwards, according to
Justice Brennan, "since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution
was adopted." Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577 n.4.
91. Id. at 2578. As the Court had previously held, once a statute has failed one prong of the
test, no further examination is necessary. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985). In
Edwards, Justice Brennan wrote, "Lemon's first prong focuses on the purpose that animated adop-
tion of the Act. 'The purpose prong ... asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion.' ... This intention may be evidenced by promotion of religion in general, or
by advancement of a particular religious belief." Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2578 (citation omitted)
(quoting from Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
92. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West 1982).
93. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss2/2
EDWARDS v. AGUILLARD
Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular pur-
pose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not
a sham."9 4 The "sham" label came from the Court's conclusion that the
Balanced Treatment Act did nothing to promote academic freedom.95
Before passage of the Balanced Treatment Act, Louisiana teachers were
already allowed to supplement their teachings on evolution with any
other scientific theory.96 Therefore, Justice Brennan declared the case to
be analogous to Wallace v. Jaffree,97 where a statute was held to be un-
constitutional because there was no secular purpose for the addition of
the phrase "or voluntary prayer" to a statute allowing for a daily mo-
ment of silence in public schools. 98
Second, the Court found that the legislature's purpose for passing
the statute was preeminently religious.99 After reviewing the legislative
history of the Balanced Treatment Act, Justice Brennan concluded that
it was passed with the intent of restructuring the curriculum of Louisiana
schools to counter the teaching of a theory which contradicted religious
tenets. 100 This marked the first time the Court determined a law to be
unconstitutional due to the law's primary purpose of advancing a reli-
gious belief.1'
The majority concluded that the district court had not erred in
granting summary judgment."°2 Again, legislative purpose was determi-
native. After implying that a finding of improper legislative purpose left
no genuine issue of material fact,10 3 Justice Brennan listed the factors
94. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2579.
95. Id. at 2579-80.
96. Id. at 2580.
97. 472 U.S. 38 (1984).
98. Id. at 59.
99. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2580. Throughout the Edwards decision, Justice Brennan appar-
ently uses the adjectives "preeminent" and "primary" interchangeably to describe the Court's con-
clusion of the purpose of the Balanced Treatment Act. See id. (Court cannot ignore the legislature's
"preeminent religious purpose"); id. at 2581 (Court refers to the preeminent purpose of the Louisi-
ana legislature to advance a religious viewpoint); id. at 2582 (Court concludes that the Act's primary
purpose to provide persuasive advantage to religious tenets); id. (the Balanced Treatment Act un-
constitutionally endorses religion because its primary purpose is to advance religious belief); id. at
2583 (primary purpose of the Balanced Treatment Act is to advance religious doctrine; thus, the Act
is unconstitutional).
100. Id. at 2581-83.
101. "Because the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious
belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First Amendment." Id. at 2582.
102. Id. at 2584.
103. Justice Brennan explained:
The District Court, in its discretion, properly concluded that a Monday-morning 'battle of
the experts' over possible technical meanings of terms in the statute would not illuminate
the contemporaneous purpose of the Louisiana legislature when it made the law. We
1987)
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which the Court can use to determine legislative purpose: the statute's
plain meaning and context, legislative history, and the specific sequence
of events leading to the statute's passage.1°4
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Begin-
ning with the assumption that the purpose prong of the Lemon test is
valid, ' 5 Justice Scalia first focused on the Balanced Treatment Act's leg-
islative history.'" 6 In his view, the history showed a secular legislative
intent.'0 7 He then expressed his displeasure with the Lemon test's pur-
pose prong,10 8 and contended that the Court had made a "maze of the
Establishment Clause."' 10 9
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion concluded with a recommenda-
tion that use of Lemon's purpose prong be discontinued." 0  He called
any interpretation of the first amendment which prohibits nonsecular
purpose without regard to effect "unnatural,"" '  and concluded that the
purpose prong was unnecessary in any Establishment Clause examina-
tion."'2 Justice Scalia wrote that the Court's previous Establishment
Clause decisions had focused on flexible standards at the expense of clar-
ity and predictability. He contended that clarity and predictability
should be the objectives, and that abandoning the purpose prong of the
Lemon test would be a good start toward achieving those goals.' '3
V. ANALYSIS
A. Classifying Creationism as a Science
With the exception of the use of the term "creation-science," the
Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act clearly avoided expressions with even
remotely sectarian connotation. The words "God," "Supreme Being," or
even "Creator" never appeared in the Act." 14 The statute was written in
the context of mandating equal treatment of two "sciences": "Evolution-
therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that appellants failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact, and in granting summary judgment.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
104. Id. at 2583.
105. Id. at 2591 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id.




114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-286.7 (West 1982).
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science," which was defined as "the scientific evidences for evolution and
inferences from those scientific evidences,"' 5 and "Creation-science,"
which was defined almost identically as "the scientific evidences for crea-
tion and inferences from those scientific evidences."" ' 6 Regardless of
whether the intent of the Balanced Treatment Act was secular or reli-
gious, the lawmakers undoubtedly proposed to avoid invalidation of the
Act under the Lemon test by professing a secular purpose and using neu-
tral language.' 17
Justice Brennan expressed the majority's disbelief that creation-sci-
ence is a secular concept by pointing to the legislative hearings prior to
the Act's passage.' 18 At the hearings, Edward Boudreaux, described as
Senator Keith's leading expert on creation-science, testified that creation-
scientists believe in "the existence of a supernatural creator."' 19 Justice
Brennan concluded that the legislative history revealed that the term
"creation science," as contemplated by the legislature, embodied the reli-
gious belief that a supernatural being created humankind.' 2 ° He also
contended that several legislators revealed their religious motives for sup-
porting the bill, including Representative Jenkins, who observed that the
existence of God is a scientific fact.1 2' Thus, from the statements of a
creation-scientist and several of the state legislators, Justice Brennan in-
ferred the nonsecular purpose of the entire legislature. 122
115. Id. at § 17:286.3(3).
116. Id. at § 17:286.3(2).
117. This definition is very different from that in Senator Keith's original bill. His original bill
was based on a model act, which Arkansas adopted and a district court subsequently declared un-
constitutional. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Keith's
original proposal defined "creation-science" as including:
The scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate
(a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing;
(b) the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development
of all living kinds from a single organism;
(c) changes only within fixed limits or originally created kinds of plants and animals;
(d) separate ancestry for man and apes;
(e) explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a
worldwide flood; and
(f) a relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds.
Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2586 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring). The day following the filing of the
original complaint in McLean, the Louisiana legislature began amendment proceedings to change
the definition of "creation-science" in the Keith bill. Id.
118. Id. at 2581-82.
119. Id. at 2581.
120. Id. at 2582.
121. Id. at 2581 n.13.
122. Justice Powell reached a sectarian definition of "creation-science" another way, by invoking
the canon of statutory construction that words not otherwise defined are given their "ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning." Id. at 2585 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell determined that
"creation" is commonly defined as "holding that matter, the various forms of life, and the world
15
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While Justice Brennan stopped his analysis of the Balanced Treat-
ment Act with the Act's failure to meet the purpose prong of the Lemon
test, he hinted that such an act might be constitutional if it were passed
with a valid secular purpose. 23 In previous cases, the Court flatly stated
that religious doctrines may constitutionally be taught in public schools
so long as they are presented in an objective fashion 24 as part of the
State mandated curriculum. 25 Justice Brennan included a similar dis-
claimer in Edwards, stating that the majority opinion does not imply that
a legislature cannot require the teaching of scientific critiques of prevail-
ing theories.' 26 Because the Court determined that the Balanced Treat-
ment Act was not passed with a secular purpose, though, Justice
Brennan did not state whether this Act would have been constitutional if
not for the legislature's improper purpose in passing it.
The majority opinion did slightly expand upon the implication made
in Stone that religious materials could be used in public schools for an
"educational function."'' 27 According to Abington, the educational func-
tion requirement could be satisfied by an objective presentation of reli-
gious materials in a secular setting.' 28  In Edwards, Justice Brennan
elaborated further, stating that simply presenting a variety of scientific
theories of human origin would satisfy the purpose prong.' 29 Apparently
then, the idea of an objective presentation "as part of a secular program
of education" means the teaching of a variety of theories with a clear
secular intent.
were created by a transcendent God out of nothing," and reached the conclusion that "[0rom the
face of the statute, a purpose to advance a religious belief is apparent." Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
In dissent, Justice Scalia labeled "creation-science" a "term of art" which is " 'to be interpreted
according to [its] received meaning and acceptation with the learned in the art, trade or profession to
which [it] refer[s].'" Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting from LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. Art. 15- (West 1952)). The dissent argued that the legislative history supported the
contention that creationism could be taught in public schools without reference to any particular
religious dogma. Id. at 2585 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the final analysis, though, Justice Scalia felt
the true definition of "creation-science" was a moot point: "[o]ur task," he wrote, "is not to judge
the debate about teaching the origins of life, but to ascertain what the members of the Louisiana
Legislature believed." Id. at 2598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia felt that the definition criti-
cal to the decision was the one to which the legislature subscribed.
123. "We do not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing
scientific theories be taught." Id. at 2582.
124. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam).
125. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
126. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2582.
127. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
128. Abington, 374 U.S. at 225. The Stone Court expanded this allowable field of education to an
"appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone, 449 U.S.
at 42.
129. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2583.
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The implication of these cases seems to be that the Court will up-
hold the teaching of religious doctrine in public schools so long as the
purpose of allowing such teaching is secular, and the material is
presented both objectively and as part of a variety of theories offered
regarding a subject. Although the Edwards Court never discussed the
issue, the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act appeared to meet the objec-
tivity requirement. The Balanced Treatment Act stated that "[w]hen
creation or evolution is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, rather
than asproven scientific fact. "130 The Court also did not rule on whether
the presentation of two theories constituted a "variety" and offered no
clue as to Whether it might. The purpose of the Balanced Treatment Act
was the decisive factor in determining its constitutionality.
B. Application of the Purpose Prong
The Supreme Court had anticipated that a legislature might feign a
secular purpose for an act passed with truly religious intent. 131 Justice
Rehnquist contended in his dissent in Wallace that the purpose prong
was of little use if all a legislature had to do to pass an act was to include
a statement of secular purpose and omit all sectarian references. 132 Four
years earlier, the Louisiana legislature possibly did just that; with the
stated purpose of protecting academic freedom, 133 it passed the Balanced
Treatment Act. In 1987, the United States Supreme Court held that this
stated purpose was not genuine and that the Act's actual purpose was
invalid;' 34 but in reaching its decision the Court clarified its purpose
prong standard by holding that a primary purpose of advancing religion
is sufficient to strike down a statute.
135
Courts traditionally have dealt with the purpose prong of the Lemon
test in a cursory manner when the challenged statute contained an ex-
press statement of purpose. 1 36 The Lemon case itself gave "appropriate
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.4(A) (West 1982) (emphasis added).
131. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (acknowl-
edging the possibility that a legislature's avowed secular purpose could be a sham).
132. Id. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West 1982).
134. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578-79 (1987).
135. Id. at 2582.
136. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Edue. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973), where the Court
summarily agreed with the legislative statement of secular purpose by writing "we need touch only
briefly on the requirement of a 'secular legislative purpose.' As the recitation of legislative purposes
appended to New York's law indicates, each measure is adequately supported by legitimate, nonsec-
tarian state interests." See also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (citing the Abihg-
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deference" to a stated legislative intent.1 37 The statute challenged in
Stone failed the first prong of the Lemon test when the Court found that
the statute had "no secular legislative purpose."' 138 Similar words were
used to invalidate the Wallace statute.' 39 In Wallace, Justice Stevens ex-
plained the Court's application of the purpose prong when he stated that
a statute may satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test despite the exist-
ence of a partially religious motivation. 140  Justice Stevens wrote that
"even though a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose
may satisfy the first criterion ... the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to
advance religion.""14 The Edwards Court went beyond this explanation
of the purpose prong.
In Edwards, the Court further clarified the application of the pur-
pose prong when it held that the Balanced Treatment Act was unconsti-
tutional for having a primary purpose of advancing a religious belief.142
Although the Court never explicitly stated the degree of permissible reli-
gious motivation in the passage of legislation,' 43 the Court repeatedly
referred to the Balanced Treatment Act's "preeminent religious pur-
pose"'" and "primary purpose" to advance religion. 145 Thus, the Court
137. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court observed that "the statutes them-
selves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the secular education in all
schools covered by the ... [challenged] laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant
anything else." Id. at 613.
138. "We conclude that Kentucky's statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in
public school rooms has no secular legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional." Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam). The Court went on to confuse the standard it used,
though, by stating that "[tjhe preeminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on school-
room walls is plainly religious in nature." Id.
139. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
140. Id.
141. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
142. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2582 (1987).
143. The Court appeared to cite as its standard a quote from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38. "'It is not a trivial matter ... to require that the legislature manifest a
secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements from its laws. That requirement is precisely
tailored to the Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that government not intentionally endorse
religion or a religious practice.'" Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2582 (quoting Wallace, 742 U.S. at 75
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Even though Justice Brennan appeared to quote this statement for use as a benchmark, lie made
no further reference to omitting all sectarian endorsements. Subsequent references to the purpose
prong spoke in terms of "preeminent" or "primary" religious purpose. See infra note 145.
144. Id. at 2580, 2581.
145. Id. at 2582 (primary purpose to advance religion demonstrated by legislative history). The
Court also noted that "[b]ecause the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to advance a particu-
lar religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First Amendment." Id. "[B]ecause
the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act
furthers religion in violation of the Establishment Clause" Id. at 2583.
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implicitly explained the purpose prong more precisely than it had before.
The Stone Court struck down a statute with no secular legislative pur-
pose.' 46 The Wallace Court stated that a partially religious purpose may
be valid. 147 The Edwards Court clarified that standard by holding that
the preeminent or primary purpose of a statute must not be religious in
order to pass the purpose prong of the Lemon test.
1 48
The Court applied the new standard after determining that the Act's
stated purpose was not valid. The Court's examination focused on one of
the vital areas stated in Wallace v. Jaffree: Did the statute serve any
secular purpose which was not already served by the existing law?
149
The answer in Edwards, as in Wallace, was "no." Justice Brennan cited
the testimony of the president of the Louisiana Science Teachers Associa-
tion, who said that no new legislation was necessary to allow the teaching
of any scientific concept based on established fact. 150 Justice Brennan
wrote that because the Act did not provide Louisiana school teachers
with any new authority, it failed to further its stated purpose.'-" Because
the Balanced Treatment Act served no new secular purpose, the Court
concluded that the law's stated purpose was a sham.
15 2
After indicating that the legislature's stated purpose for passing the
Balanced Treatment Act was not genuine, the Court next had to deter-
mine the statute's true purpose. The Act would still pass the first prong
of the Lemon test, regardless of its failure to further the stated purpose,
so long as the actual purpose was secular.15 3 Justice Brennan felt that
the legislature's preeminent religious purpose in passing the Balanced
Treatment Act was obvious. 154 The majority of the Court agreed and
held the Act unconstitutional, even though this was the first time that a
primary purpose to advance religion was held to constitute an Establish-
ment Clause violation under the Lemon test.1 55
146. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam).
147. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
148. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2583.
149. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59.
150. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2579.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2580.
153. The Court in Edwards noted that although the Balanced Treatment Act had a stated secu-
lar purpose, it in fact did not support that goal. Furthermore, the Court found that the Balanced
Treatment Act had no clear secular purpose. Id. at 2578.
154. Id. at 2582.
155. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Court, applying the Lemon test, stated that
only statutes motivated in part by a religious purpose may still satisfy the purpose prong. Id. at 56.
In finding a religious purpose, the Court analogized Edwards with Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968), which dealt with a 1928 "anti-evolution" statute. Justice Brennan felt that both cases
1987]
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C. The Utility of the Purpose Prong
The purpose prong of the Lemon test contains two flaws. First, de-
spite the majority of the Supreme Court's contention, ascertaining the
true purpose behind legislation is very difficult.' 56 Second, the Court's
current method of applying the purpose prong confuses purpose and ef-
fect. Because of these defects, the purpose prong of the Lemon test
should be discarded.
Determination of the collective motive behind the actions of legisla-
tors is difficult because of the many different purposes that may be in-
volved. While a majority of the state's House and Senate approved the
Balanced Treatment Act,'5 7 the Edwards Court focused on the actions
and statements of the bill's sponsor, Senator Keith." 8 In reaching the
conclusion that the purpose of the entire legislature in passing the Act
must have been nonsecular,159 the Court took a rather large step in de-
ductive reasoning. While Senator Keith may be the definitive source for
determining what prompted the introduction of the legislation, his state-
ments can hardly be said to reflect the feelings of the entire Louisiana
legislature. Justice Brennan cited statements by two other legislators
which may lead to an inference of their religious motives, 60 but the
Court could not possibly have known the true intent of the majority of
the lawmakers who voted in favor of the Act. 161
involved attempts by the state legislature to support a theory of Divine Creation. Edwards, 107 S.
Ct. at 2581. In support of his conclusion, Justice Brennan looked to the legislative hearings and the
remarks of Senator Keith, the bill's sponsor. Id. at 2581. Senator Keith advocated the teaching of
religious views in public schools to counterbalance the teaching of the theory of evolution, which
conflicted with his own beliefs. Id. The majority was certain that the Louisiana legislature's purpose
in passing the Balanced Treatment Act was to promote religion. Id. Therefore, the Court declared
the Act unconstitutional. Id. at 2582.
156. "I have little doubt that our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose
from a sincere one .. " Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2597 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. "It is clear from the legislative history that the purpose of the legislative sponsor, Senator
Bill Keith, was to narrow the science curriculum." Id. at 2579. See also id. at 2581 n.13 (Court
refers to sponsor's belief as embodying the purpose of the Act); id. at 2582 (Court infers religious
purpose by reference to the sponsor's own statements).
159. Id. The Court noted that Senator Keith had argued in the legislature that scientific evi-
dence supporting his religious beliefs should be taught in public schools. Having then passed the
Balanced Treatment Act, the legislature intended to change the existing curriculum and endorse a
religious view.
160. Id. at 2581 n.13.
161. Justice Scalia attacked this Act of imputing the motive of all legislators through the state-
ments of a few. He demonstrated the futility of attempting to find a single legislative purpose for the
passage of an act by listing some of the considerations a legislator makes:
The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite. In
the present case, for example, a particular legislator need not have voted for the Act either
because he wanted to foster religion or because he wanted to improve education. He may
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The second problem with the application of Lemon's purpose prong
is its confusion between purpose and effect. In Edwards, the majority
claimed that by looking at the language of the statute and its legislative
history they could discern what must have been the intent of the legisla-
ture. 62 Justice Brennan's majority opinion stated that a religious pur-
pose "may be evidenced by promotion of religion in general ... or by
advancement of a particular religious belief... " 163 Such promotion or
advancement, though, is not really a purpose; it is an effect. The major-
ity sought to determine whether the stated purpose of the Balanced
Treatment Act was a "sham" by looking at whether the Act served a
purpose that was not already fully served by existing state law.164 Here,
again, the inquiry focused not on purpose, but on effect.
If the examination of a statute under the Lemon test were to extend
past the first prong, this method of analysis would lead to a duplication
of efforts. In Edwards, the Court said that it must look to the purpose of
the challenged act to apply the first prong of the Lemon test. 165 If the act
has a stated purpose, the Court then needs to look at the act's effect to
determine whether the stated purpose is a sham. 166 If the act has no
have thought the bill would provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to make
amends with a faction of his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have been a
close friend of the bill's sponsor, or he may have been repaying a favor he owed the Major-
ity Leader, or he may have hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make a
fundraising appearance for him, or he may have been pressured to vote for a bill he disliked
by a wealthy contributor or by a flood of constituent mail, or he may have been seeking
favorable publicity, or he may have been reluctanct to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff
member who worked on the bill, or he may have been settling an old score with a legislator
who opposed the bill, or he may have been mad at his wife who opposed the bill, or he may
have been intoxicated and utterly unmotivated when the vote was called, or he may have
accidentally voted "yes" instead of "no," or, of course, he may have had (and very likely
did have) a combination of some of the above and many other motivations. To look for the
sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not exist.
Id. at 2605-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia now joins Chief Justice
Rehnquist as an open opponent of the purpose prong of Lemon. Justice Rehnquist had already
criticized the entire Lemon test in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985), and called for the
discontinuation of its use. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion concluded with a call for the purpose
prong's abandonment. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. "The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana legislature was clearly to advance the religious
viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind." Id. at 2581 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 2578 (citations omitted).
164. "The goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered either by
outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teaching of creation science." Id. at 2579.
The Court also stated that "[t]he Act provides Louisiana schoolteachers with no new authority.
Thus the stated purpose is not furthered by it." Id.
165. Id. at 2578 ("Lemon's first prong focuses on the purpose that animated adoption of the
Act").
166. Id. at 2578-79. The Court determined that the stated purpose of the Act was a sham after
examining whether the Act furthered its stated purpose. This examination actually focuses on the
Act's effect, rather than on its purpose.
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stated purpose, the Court finds a religious purpose if the statute promotes
religion in general or advances a particular religious belief.'67 If the
stated purpose is not a sham and the actual purpose of the act is indeed
secular, then the Court must move on to the second prong of the test to
examine the effect of the act, which it has already done.168 Such duplic-
ity suggests that the purpose prong of the Lemon test can be eliminated
with no ill effect.
Discarding Lemon's purpose prong would greatly simplify and clar-
ify the Court's examination of Establishment Clause cases. The necessity
of trying to determine actual motives for the passage of legislation would
end, and the unpleasant connotation of purposes being labeled as
"shams" would be eliminated. The results of Establishment Clause ex-
amination, though, would not change. Well written statutes with genu-
ine, primarily religious purposes would have primarily religious effects
and, therefore, would be struck down under a two pronged "effect and
entanglement" test. Statutes with religious purposes that were so poorly
written that they had no religious effects would not be repugnant to the
Establishment Clause. The most favorable outcome would lie in the
trickiest of the statutes: those passed with partially secular and partially
religious intent. Effect and entanglement would be the decisive factors in
determining the constitutionality of such acts. While the test would still
be less than mathematically precise, determining degrees of effect and
entanglement will be more just and less complicated than attempting to
determine degree of improper intent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Edwards decision demonstrates that the major problem with the
purpose prong of the Lemon test is the determination of actual purpose,
if one primary purpose can be determined at all. The Court has struck
down laws with no stated purpose, with a stated sectarian purpose, and
with a stated secular purpose which the Court has determined to be a
"sham." In using the Lemon test, examinations have ranged from cur-
sory facial readings with great deference given to stated legislative intent,
167. Id. at 2578.
168. Id. at 2577. The second prong of the Lemon test asks whether the statute's principal or
primary effect advances religion. However, a statute which advances religion is usually viewed as
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to in-depth scrutiny of legislative hearings to find the legislature's "hid-
den intent." What level of inquiry the Court will use in any given case is
as unpredictable as the conclusion it will reach.
Such unpredictability leads to the question of whether the purpose
prong of the Lemon test is actually necessary. It probably is not. A two-
pronged "effect and entanglement" test for violation of the Establishment
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